6a8808a0bbReject WebCrypto cipher operations whose computed output length would exceed INT_MAX before passing the length to OpenSSL. This avoids signed overflow in the AES and ChaCha20-Poly1305 one-shot cipher paths and turns oversized inputs into a clean operation failure. Refs: https://hackerone.com/reports/3760016 Signed-off-by: Filip Skokan <panva.ip@gmail.com> PR-URL: https://github.com/nodejs-private/node-private/pull/878 Reviewed-By: Antoine du Hamel <duhamelantoine1995@gmail.com> CVE-ID: CVE-2026-48933
67 lines
2.6 KiB
C++
67 lines
2.6 KiB
C++
// This simulates specifying the configuration option --openssl-system-ca-path
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// and setting it to a file that does not exist.
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#define NODE_OPENSSL_SYSTEM_CERT_PATH "/missing/ca.pem"
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#include "crypto/crypto_cipher.h"
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#include "crypto/crypto_context.h"
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#include "gtest/gtest.h"
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#include "node_options.h"
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#include "openssl/err.h"
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#include <climits>
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/*
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* This test verifies that a call to NewRootCertDir with the build time
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* configuration option --openssl-system-ca-path set to an missing file, will
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* not leave any OpenSSL errors on the OpenSSL error stack.
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* See https://github.com/nodejs/node/issues/35456 for details.
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*/
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TEST(NodeCrypto, NewRootCertStore) {
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node::per_process::cli_options->ssl_openssl_cert_store = true;
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X509_STORE* store = node::crypto::NewRootCertStore(nullptr);
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ASSERT_TRUE(store);
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ASSERT_EQ(ERR_peek_error(), 0UL) << "NewRootCertStore should not have left "
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"any errors on the OpenSSL error stack\n";
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X509_STORE_free(store);
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}
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/*
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* This test verifies that OpenSSL memory tracking constants are properly
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* defined.
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*/
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TEST(NodeCrypto, MemoryTrackingConstants) {
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// Verify that our memory tracking constants are defined and reasonable
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EXPECT_GT(node::crypto::kSizeOf_SSL_CTX, static_cast<size_t>(0))
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<< "SSL_CTX size constant should be positive";
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EXPECT_GT(node::crypto::kSizeOf_X509, static_cast<size_t>(0))
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<< "X509 size constant should be positive";
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EXPECT_GT(node::crypto::kSizeOf_EVP_MD_CTX, static_cast<size_t>(0))
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<< "EVP_MD_CTX size constant should be positive";
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// Verify reasonable size ranges (basic sanity check)
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EXPECT_LT(node::crypto::kSizeOf_SSL_CTX, static_cast<size_t>(10000))
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<< "SSL_CTX size should be reasonable";
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EXPECT_LT(node::crypto::kSizeOf_X509, static_cast<size_t>(10000))
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<< "X509 size should be reasonable";
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EXPECT_LT(node::crypto::kSizeOf_EVP_MD_CTX, static_cast<size_t>(1000))
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<< "EVP_MD_CTX size should be reasonable";
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// Specific values we expect based on our implementation
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EXPECT_EQ(node::crypto::kSizeOf_SSL_CTX, static_cast<size_t>(240));
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EXPECT_EQ(node::crypto::kSizeOf_X509, static_cast<size_t>(128));
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EXPECT_EQ(node::crypto::kSizeOf_EVP_MD_CTX, static_cast<size_t>(48));
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}
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TEST(NodeCrypto, TryGetIntCipherOutputLength) {
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int output_len = 0;
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EXPECT_TRUE(
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node::crypto::TryGetIntCipherOutputLength(INT_MAX - 16, 16, &output_len));
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EXPECT_EQ(output_len, INT_MAX);
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EXPECT_FALSE(
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node::crypto::TryGetIntCipherOutputLength(INT_MAX - 15, 16, &output_len));
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EXPECT_FALSE(node::crypto::TryGetIntCipherOutputLength(
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0, static_cast<size_t>(INT_MAX) + 1, &output_len));
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}
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